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EQUALITY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPT
INTRODUCTION BY WHITMAN H. RIDGWAY*
The notion of equality permeated the Revolutionary period, yet
the unamended Constitution was mute on the subject. The Declara-
tion of Independence confidently asserted, "We hold these truths to
be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are en-
dowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."' Yet America
in the 1780s was a slaveholding nation, and people expected that
their individual rights would be protected by state constitutions.
Only after the Anti-Federalists complained of the potential threat to
individual liberty posed by the new federal government was a Bill of
Rights adopted by amendment in 1791.
The promise of the Declaration of Independence would be real-
ized only after the destruction of slavery and the ratification of the
thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. These important amend-
ments gave the federal government the responsibility to protect the
rights of individual citizens against state action. In the words of the
fourteenth amendment:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
law.2
Henceforth, the privileges and immunities, due process, and equal
protection clauses would be the means through which equality as a
constitutional concept would be secured.
The problems of racial equality were not solved during the Re-
construction era. The relegation of black Americans to a second-
class citizenship was recognized when the Supreme Court accepted
the notion of "separate but equal" in Plessy v. Ferguson.3 The "sepa-
rate but equal" fiction was rejected in 1954 when the Court decided
* Associate Professor of History, University of Maryland College Park.
1. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896) (statute requiring separate but equal railway accom-
modations for whites and blacks does not violate the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment).
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to end segregated schools in Brown v. Board of Education.4 During the
Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations the federal govern-
ment called for the end of segregation. Laws were passed that at-
tempted to ensure full legal, civil, and voting rights for blacks and
other minority groups.5 Serious problems, however, remain.
The question of gender equality has been an important topic
since the end of World War II. Unmentioned in the Constitution,
and seen as a dependent class during most of the nineteenth cen-
tury, women have asserted their right to equality before the law with
greater success in the twentieth century. Ratification of the nine-
teenth amendment gave women the vote in 1920, but absolute
equality has been more elusive. Statutes and court decisions have
struck down gender distinctions with some success. 6
One controversial strategy to compensate for past racial and
gender discrimination has been the adoption of affirmative action
programs. These programs place women and members of racial mi-
nority groups into jobs and training programs previously unavaila-
ble to them ahead of other workers. During the spring of 1987 the
Supreme Court decided in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa
Clara County, 7 that an affirmative action program designed to pro-
mote women and minorities was constitutional.
There is a contemporary debate between those who feel the Na-
tion has gone too far by the adoption of affirmative action programs
and those who argue that it has not gone far enough. The debate
4. 347 U.S. 972 (1954) (separate but equal doctrine as applied to school segrega-
tion violates the equal protection clause). See also Schiro v. Bynum, 375 U.S. 395 (1964)
(invalidating segregation in municipal auditoriums); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369
U.S. 350 (1962) (airport restaurants); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (buses);
Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (public beaches and bathhouses);
Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954) (parks).
5. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified at
scattered sections of 18, 25, and 42 U.S.C. (1982)); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No.
88-352, 74 Stat. 90 (codified at scattered sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C. (1982)); Civil
Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86 (codified at scattered sections of 18,
20, and 42 U.S.C. (1982)); Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 5315 and scattered sections of 28 and 48 U.S.C.
(1982)).
6. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (presumption that widows, but
not widowers, were dependent on their spouses and qualified for death benefits violates
equal protection clause); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (law prohibiting the sale of
3.2% beer to men under 18 and women under 21); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973) (federal law permitting male members of the armed forces to claim their
spouses as dependents, but not allowing female members to claim their spouses absent
proof of dependency); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (state law giving men prefer-
ence over women as administrators of estates).
7. 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987).
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hinges on what the proponents believe the Constitution allows.
Those who assert that we have gone too far argue that under a neu-
tral Constitution previous race and gender discrimination cannot be
used to justify plans which benefit one group to the disadvantage of
another on the basis of race or gender. As typified by the case of
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,8 this school of thought
maintains that members of the majority have equal rights that ought
to be protected. Those who believe we have not gone far enough
focus on implied rights derived from a broad reading of the Consti-
tution and assert the need for society to correct past wrongs
through remedial legislation.
The nomination of Judge Robert Bork to the United States
Supreme Court underscored the immediacy of this debate at the
time of Mr. Rowan's lecture. Judge Bork's reputation as a strict con-
structionist made him a favorite of those who believe we have gone
too far, because they hoped that he would join a new majority that
would reverse the Court's modern trend. Those who feel we have
not gone far enough maintained that Judge Bork's published views
as a scholar constituted a threat to recent Court decisions recogniz-
ing racial and gender equality. Indeed, they believed that Judge
Bork's strict constructionist judicial philosophy would serve to re-
verse such decisions were he confirmed by the Senate.
Perhaps, the source of the controversy lies in the underlying
concept of equality, which continues to elude definition. It is un-
clear whether equality protects individuals or groups. It is even un-
clear how far this protection should extend.
8. 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1977) (medical school's admissions program, which set aside
16 out of 100 positions for members of minority groups, violates the equal protection
clause because whites with higher scores were denied admission).
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